🐬 Wi-Fi and Network Security Audit Report (Flipper Zero Integration) #

Subject: Security Audit of Wi-Fi and Network Infrastructure
Date of Test: 1 June 2024 – 10 June 2024
Location: Bristol, United Kingdom
Company Conducting the Test: CyberSentinel Solutions LTD
Version: 1.0

📑 Executive Summary #

This report provides a detailed analysis of the Wi-Fi and network infrastructure security audit conducted by CyberSentinel Solutions LTD in June 2024. The testing involved advanced tools, notably the Flipper Zero, a versatile device used for signal analysis, frequency monitoring, and remote access assessment.

The audit focused on discovering vulnerabilities within the Wi-Fi network, local infrastructure, and network segmentation, with an emphasis on radio frequency (RF) attacks, device emulation, and network manipulation. The Flipper Zero was instrumental in simulating attacks targeting the 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands, conducting NFC/RFID cloning, signal jamming, and brute-forcing network authentication.

Scope of the Audit:

[01] Wi-Fi Networks (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz bands)
[02] Local Area Network (LAN)
[03] Network Segmentation
[04] NFC, RFID, and BLE Devices

🎯 Test Objective #

The objective of the network security audit was to:

Assess Wi-Fi encryption and authentication mechanisms to identify vulnerabilities in password and protocol strength.
Simulate signal jamming and deauthentication attacks using RF-based tools.
Investigate NFC/RFID vulnerabilities in IoT devices and access control systems.
Identify weaknesses in network segmentation and device discovery.
Test for insecure network services and potential backdoors in connected devices.

🛠️ Test Methodology & Tactical Toolkit #

The assessment combined traditional network penetration testing methodologies with advanced physical and RF exploitation techniques.

# Tactical Toolkit [RF & Wireless Exploitation]
equipment:
  - hardware: "Flipper Zero"
    use: "RF signal jamming, Sub-GHz analysis, NFC/RFID cloning, BLE scanning, and Wi-Fi deauthentication (via devboard)."
  - software: "Aircrack-ng Suite (v1.7)"
    use: "Capturing Wi-Fi handshakes and offline WPA2/WPA3 password cracking."
  - software: "Wireshark (v4.0)"
    use: "Packet analysis for wireless and local network traffic."
  - hardware: "Kali Linux (v2024.1)"
    use: "Primary penetration testing OS (Bettercap, nmap, Metasploit)."
  - hardware: "Alfa AWUS036ACH Wi-Fi Adapter"
    use: "High-powered Wi-Fi adapter for packet capture and injection."
  - software: "Bettercap (v2.33.2)"
    use: "MitM attacks, network reconnaissance, and ARP spoofing."
  - software: "Metasploit Framework (v6.3)"
    use: "Exploitation of discovered vulnerabilities and misconfigured services."

🔬 Phases of the Security Assessment #

Phase 1: Wi-Fi Discovery and Signal Analysis (Flipper Zero) #

Date: 1 June 2024 – 2 June 2024
Objective: Discover nearby networks, analyze signal strength, and gather encryption details.
Procedure: Used the Flipper Zero’s Wi-Fi Module (ESP32) to scan the 2.4/5 GHz bands. Monitored signal strength to identify weak access points. Client discovery was performed via airodump-ng.
Outcome: Detected Corporate_WiFi (WPA2-Enterprise) and Guest_WiFi (WPA2-PSK). Identified severe signal interference on channel 6 (2.4 GHz). 15 connected clients were mapped.

Phase 2: Deauthentication Attacks and Network Jamming #

Date: 3 June 2024
Objective: Test network resilience and availability.
1. Deauthentication Attack: Outcome: Using the Flipper Zero, deauth frames were successfully injected into the Guest_WiFi network. This forced client disconnections and allowed the successful capture of the WPA2 4-way handshake.
2. Signal Jamming: Outcome: The Flipper Zero’s Sub-GHz/RF capabilities were used to flood the 2.4 GHz spectrum with noise. The Guest_WiFi experienced significant disruption. The Corporate_WiFi (5 GHz) remained unaffected.

Phase 3: WPA2/WPA3 Password Cracking #

Date: 4 June 2024 – 5 June 2024
Objective: Crack captured handshakes to gain unauthorized network access.
1. WPA2-PSK Cracking: Outcome: The captured handshake for Guest_WiFi was subjected to an offline dictionary attack using aircrack-ng. The password (“guest2024”) was cracked in under 3 hours.
2. WPA3 Resistance: Outcome: Attempts to capture and crack WPA3 handshakes from the Corporate_WiFi failed. The Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) protocol successfully mitigated brute-force attempts.

Phase 4: NFC/RFID Security Testing (Physical Access) #

Date: 6 June 2024
Objective: Test physical access controls and IoT physical security.
1. RFID Cloning (125 kHz): Outcome: CRITICAL. The Flipper Zero successfully read, saved, and emulated employee 125 kHz low-frequency RFID badges. This allowed researchers to bypass the main office access control system and gain physical entry.
2. NFC Emulation Attack: Outcome: NFC tags used to configure smart printers and unlock specific office cabinets were read and emulated. Lack of cryptographic challenge-response allowed full control over these IoT endpoints.

Phase 5: Internal Network Scanning and Exploitation #

Date: 7 June 2024 – 8 June 2024
Objective: Discover internal devices, ports, and exploit misconfigurations.
Procedure: Used nmap for IP discovery and the Flipper Zero for BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) device interrogation.
Outcome: Discovered 50 active IP devices and several vulnerable BLE endpoints (e.g., smart displays with open pairing). Exploited an outdated printer (RCE) and a file server running SMBv1 (EternalBlue) using Metasploit, granting elevated network privileges.

Phase 6: Network Segmentation & Firewall Audit #

Date: 9 June 2024
Objective: Test isolation between network zones.
Outcome: Guest_WiFi was properly segmented from the corporate LAN. However, internal firewall rules were overly permissive, allowing unnecessary outbound connections and exposing internal FTP/SSH services to external subnets.

📊 Vulnerability Overview Matrix #

Vulnerability	Severity	Status	Notes
Weak Guest Wi-Fi Password	CRITICAL	❌ Not Fixed	Easily cracked using dictionary attack (“guest2024”).
Insecure RFID Access System	CRITICAL	❌ Not Fixed	Unencrypted 125 kHz RFID cards cloned via Flipper Zero, allowing physical facility breach.
Outdated Printer Firmware (RCE)	HIGH	❌ Not Fixed	Exploited for remote code execution.
SMBv1 Enabled on File Server	HIGH	❌ Not Fixed	Exploited via EternalBlue attack.
Unencrypted NFC Devices	HIGH	❌ Not Fixed	NFC tags on smart locks/IoT vulnerable to replay and emulation attacks.
Permissive Firewall Rules	MEDIUM	❌ Not Fixed	Unnecessary services (FTP/SSH) exposed across network boundaries.
RF Signal Interference Vulnerability	MEDIUM	❌ Not Fixed	2.4 GHz Wi-Fi network easily disrupted via RF noise generation.

🛡️ Strategic Recommendations #

Strengthen Guest Wi-Fi Security: Upgrade the guest network to WPA3 encryption. If unsupported by legacy devices, enforce a highly complex, rotating WPA2 password.
Upgrade RFID Access Systems: Immediately replace legacy 125 kHz RFID systems with high-frequency (13.56 MHz), cryptographically secure smart cards (e.g., MIFARE DESFire EV3 or iCLASS SE) to prevent cloning attacks.
Update Firmware & Disable Legacy Protocols: Apply security patches to all printers and disable SMBv1 on all file servers to prevent RCE and lateral movement.
Isolate IoT and BLE Devices: Ensure proper network segmentation (dedicated VLANs) for IoT devices and disable unauthorized BLE pairing modes on office equipment.
Harden Firewall Rules: Implement a default-deny policy for internal routing. Restrict access to management ports (SSH, FTP) strictly to jump servers or management VLANs.
Mitigate Signal Jamming: Migrate critical business operations and IoT devices exclusively to the 5 GHz band, which is less susceptible to basic RF jamming attacks.

# AUTHORIZATION AND SIGN-OFF
Prepared by:
[+] Dr. James Anderson   | Lead Security Analyst
[+] Emily Walker         | Senior Network Security Engineer
Entity: CyberSentinel Solutions LTD
Date: June 2024